Canada’s Ethics Framework Is a Black Box
An analysis of the parliamentary committee review of the Conflict of Interest Act reveals a system that demands public trust instead of earning it.
On September 24, 2025, a professor emeritus from York University, Ian Greene, appeared by video before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. The committee was reviewing the Conflict of Interest Act, a piece of legislation central to the public’s confidence in its government. The testimony provided a stark look into the architecture of our federal ethics regime. What it revealed is a system built less on verifiable rules and more on opaque processes that ask you, the citizen, to simply have faith.
This points to a critical question. When faced with unprecedented situations, like a Prime Minister with deep and recent ties to a global asset management firm, is a system based on faith sufficient? The evidence presented at that committee meeting suggests it is not. The framework designed to prevent conflicts of interest often functions as a black box, obscuring transparency where it is needed most and substituting clear, enforceable rules with mechanisms that depend on the very integrity they are supposed to guarantee.
The Myth of the “Blind” Trust
The first component of this black box is the concept of the “blind trust.” The name suggests a simple, effective solution: a public office holder hands over their assets to a trustee and becomes “blind” to them, eliminating any potential for conflict. The reality, as discussed in the committee, is quite different.
During the committee’s previous meeting, the Ethics Commissioner himself stated that trustees generally do not sell the assets placed in a trust. This means the public office holder knows exactly what their holdings were at the moment the trust was created. Professor Greene confirmed this reality, explaining that while a trustee can sell assets, the official is fully aware of what went into the trust. This detail dismantles the entire premise of the trust being “blind.” It is, at best, a “no-touch” arrangement. An office holder may not direct the assets, but they possess full knowledge of their initial composition, allowing them to understand how government policy might affect their personal wealth.
“In a blind trust, a trustee has control over all the assets and makes decisions without being in touch with the person who owns the assets.” ... “What I meant is that they are aware of the assets that went into the blind trust.”
This arrangement does not eliminate the potential for conflict. It merely relocates it behind a legal curtain.
The Ethical Tinted Glass
Where a blind trust is insufficient or inappropriate, the system offers another tool: the ethics screen. This is where the black box becomes most opaque. An ethics screen is a mechanism set up by the Commissioner to prevent a public office holder from being involved in decisions that could benefit their private interests. In the case of Prime Minister Carney, the screen is administered by his chief of staff and the Clerk of the Privy Council.
Think of an ethics screen as Ethical Tinted Glass. You, the public, are standing on the sidewalk watching a car go by. You are told the driver is obeying all the rules of the road. But the windows are so darkly tinted that you cannot see inside. Is the driver paying attention? Are they making decisions in the public interest? You have no way to verify this. You are simply told to trust the driver and the passengers sitting next to him, who, in this case, serve at his pleasure.
This is precisely the critique raised by MP Michael Cooper during the hearing. He pointed out that ethics screens allow an office holder to bypass the standard rule that requires them to publicly report every time they recuse themselves from a decision to avoid a conflict. The screen privatizes the recusal process. Transparency is sacrificed for administrative neatness. Professor Greene’s defence of this system is telling. He argues that it ultimately comes down to the “integrity of the people involved.” This is a weak foundation for a national ethics law. Public trust cannot be a prerequisite for the system. It must be the outcome of a system that is transparent by design.
A System Built on Optional Integrity
Here is the detail I find most revealing from Professor Greene’s testimony. Conflict of interest scandals are more frequent at the federal level than in the provinces on a proportionate basis. His analysis points to a simple, structural reason. In eight provinces, elected members are required to have annual meetings with their ethics commissioner. This proactive engagement helps clarify rules and prevent mistakes before they happen.
At the federal level, these crucial meetings are optional.
This is a stunning gap in our federal framework. The system is fundamentally reactive. It provides advisers but does not mandate the kind of rigorous, recurring consultation that has proven effective provincially. Instead of building a hard-railed system that minimizes the chance of error, Parliament has chosen a softer approach that relies on the voluntary initiative of individual politicians. This is not a recipe for robust ethical oversight. It is an open invitation for the exact kind of scandals the Act is meant to prevent.
The “General Application” Escape Hatch
The final weakness is perhaps the most frustrating. It is a legal principle that sounds reasonable but can function as a loophole big enough to drive a trillion-dollar asset management firm through. During the meeting, MP Luc Thériault repeatedly questioned the effectiveness of the Prime Minister’s ethics screen in light of his past role at Brookfield, a company with vast interests in sectors directly affected by government legislation.
Professor Greene’s response was that most legislation the Prime Minister deals with would be considered a matter of “general application,” meaning it affects everyone, and therefore does not create a conflict of interest.
“Keep in mind that legislation that has a general impact on the public doesn’t lead to individual conflicts of interest.”
This legalistic definition dismisses the common-sense perception of a conflict. When a Prime Minister who built his career managing funds in energy, infrastructure, and technology now steers national policy in those same areas, it is difficult for a reasonably well-informed person to see no potential for conflict. The “general application” principle allows the system to ignore this perception. It provides a technical answer to an ethical problem, satisfying the letter of the law while potentially violating its spirit and eroding public confidence along the way.
The Principle of Verifiable Trust
The purpose of an ethics regime is not to ask for the public’s trust but to construct a system that earns it through its very design. The current federal framework falls short of this standard. It relies on misnamed trusts, opaque screens, optional consultations, and legalistic loopholes that prioritize administrative convenience over public transparency. These are not the components of a system built to last. A system that asks for our trust without offering proof is not a system at all, it is a gamble.
Sources:
Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. (2025, September 24). Evidence (Meeting No. 5). House of Commons of Canada.